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POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE, CAUSALITY AND SUPPLY RESPONSE 
IN WORLD MARKETS: THE CASE OF U.S. AND 
AUSTRALIAN TOBACCO 
ABSTRACT 
The economic impact of international policy interdependence is illustrated 
using the world tobacco market as an example. The price discovery process is 
assessed using U.S. and Australian data. It appears that world tobacco prices 
are set through an oligopolistic rule-of-thumb pricing system with the U.S. 
being the tacit price leader. As a result, there has been a causal relation-
ship between U.S . and Australian tobacco prices . However, no direct supply 
response to U.S. prices was observed in Australian markets . 
POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE, CAUSALITY AND SUPPLY RESPONSE 
IN WORLD MARKETS: THE CASE OF U.S. AND 
AUSTRALIAN TOBACCO 
Agricultural trade is increasingly influenced by international policy 
interdependence (Sarris and Schmitz). As a result, the world price discovery 
process is affected. For example, there is evidence of international policy 
interdependence such that U.S. tobacco prices influence the world price trend 
(Hicks, Blank and Davis). These points are significant because to the extent 
that the U.S. plays a major role in world tobacco price formation, it may in-
directly influence policy decisions in other countries concerning prices and 
levels of assistance and, as a result, may influence the supply response of 
the world industry. 
Although the choice of price levels is made by market forces in some 
countries, in many countries it is made by conscious administration, such as 
in the U.S. and Australia. The choice concerning administered price levels 
influences the levels of protection and assistance offered to domestic tobacco 
industries. When that choice is made by small importing nations such as 
Australia, international market implications (if any) may not be considered 
directly (Industries Assistance Connnission). When domestic price levels are 
determined by large exporting nations, such as the U.S., international market 
reactions must be considered because those responses can be significant. 
Objective of the Study 
To understand the economic impact of international policy interdependence 
it is necessary to understand the world market. Therefore, the objective of 
this paper is to evaluate the role played by the U.S. in the world tobacco 
market by analyzing the price discovery process in that market. In doing so, 
the following questions will be considered: (1) does the U.S. government, 
through its policies, influence world prices?, (2) if so, how does the U. S . 
influence world prices?, and (3) is there an international supply response 
to U.S. prices? 
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In this paper Australia is presented as an example of how pricing choices 
are made on international markets. Australia is a useful case study because 
its government has recently addressed the issues involved in reducing the level 
of assistance to its tobacco industry through adjustments in price levels. In 
that process they gave much consideration to their largest source of imported 
tobacco -- the U.S. 
World Market and Prices 
Before the issue of U.S. impacts on world prices can be discussed it is 
necessary to first identify a representative "world" price and to define the 
world market from which that price comes. Flue-cured tobacco represents 
approximately half of total world production and over 40 percent of total 
world exports so it will be the product form used in the analysis. 
The method used here to define a "world market" specifies countries as 
"firms" within a world-wide "industry." The world price defined here is a 
weighted average of f.o.b. export prices of major trading nations, which is 
only an indicator of "world" prices. Export f.o.b. prices are used because 
they are more likely to represent "free market" levels than would government-
supported domestic prices. 
To determine which countries are to be included in the weighted average 
to arrive at the world price, it is necessary to calculate the proportion of 
total world exports that have been contributed by each country. These nations 
are identified by considering export volumes over the three-year period 1979-81, 
rather than total production volumes, so as to specify their true impact on 
the world market. Using the standard approach of evaluating market concentration 
ratios leads to choosing the largest 4, 8 or 20 firms (exporting nations), 
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whichever number results in a ratio high enough to be considered representative 
of the entire market (Caves). In this study the 8 largest countries were used 
because a majority of the market was represented (Table 1). The prices from 
each of those countries are weighted according to their relative proportion 
of the total export quantities for the eight nations used to get the world 
price indicator. Due to the fact that the U.S. is the largest exported, two 
world prices were calculated. Countries 1-8 in Table 1 are the largest ex-
porters (representing 85% of trade) and would normally be used in calculating 
the weighted average world price. However, to allow analysis of the relation-
ship between U.S. and international prices, a second weighted average price 
was calculated using countries 2-9 (representing 58% of world exports). 
The Influence of U.S. Prices 
There has been a strong relationship between U.S. and world tobacco prices 
in the past. U.S. export prices are highly correlated (r = .99) with both the 
world price series described above. U.S. export prices are also correlated 
with the f.o.b. export prices of the eight other exporters listed in Table 1 
(r > 0.6 in all cases). Yet, the existence of such a relationship implies 
nothing about the influence (if any) of one market participant (the U.S.) over 
other participants. 
To explain the observed pricing behavior, it is necessary to consider the 
market structure. For the most part, the world tobacco market is made up of 
producer marketing boards, national trading agencies and a few large multi-
national firms. Sarris and Schmitz argue that under this market structure 
it may be more appropriate to use oligopoly theory, rather than the traditional 
competitive model, to analyze pricing in international markets. This position 
is supported by the fact that the world flue-cured tobacco industry, as 
defined here, fits the description of a "homogeneous oligopoly" provided by 
TABLE 1. WORLD EXPORTS OF FLUE-CURED TOBACCO, 1979-81 
Percent of World Exports 
1. U.S.A. 28.2 
2. Brazil 15.3 
3. Zimbabwe 15.1 
4. India 11.6 
5. Thailand 4.5 
6. Canada 4.4 
7 . Malawi 3 .3 
8 . Korea, Rep. 2.7 
9. Philippines 1.5 
Sour ce: U.S.D.A. 
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·Breimyer (p. 66-67). Breimyer says that firms in such an industry are highly 
sensitive to price competition and "price leadership or tacit collusion is 
highly likely" (p. 6 7) • 
A common oligopolistic pricing system is that of price leadership by the 
dominant firm. The price correlations described above are consistent with 
both competition and price leadership; therefore, it is possible that the U.S. 
may be performing the role of price leader for the world flue-cured tobacco 
market. Two factors give the U.S. market power: (1) it consumes about 14 
percent of all unmanufactured tobacco and is the largest exporter and importer 
of flue-cured tobacco; and (2) the structure and size of its information 
collection and dissemination . sys~em is unmatched by other market participants. 
Yet, Sarris and Schmitz question whether standard industrial organization 
pricing models, such as price leadership, are realistic when governments, rather 
than firms, set prices. 
An alternative explanation for the observed price relationships may be 
provided by the model of rule-of-thumb pricing. Rule-of-thumb pricing is an 
example of a method that can lead to monopolistic price formation through 
tacit co-ordination of independent actions of the market participants (Sarris 
and Schmitz). A typical rule-of-thumb pricing method is that of "full costing," 
as described by Breimyer (p. 53-62). Full costing is often used by governments 
when establishing minimum prices (IAC). Other rule-of-thumb methods involve 
setting prices according to specific economic variables such as inflation 
rates or product quality. In the case of tobacco, consumers have considered 
U.S. leaf to be of superior quality; thus, the observed prices reflect 
quality differences (Johnson; Reed and Schnepf). 
When developing a new formula for administering domestic prices the 
Australian government decided to use the apparent price leader (the U.S.) as 
the base, rather than prices from smaller trading nations. The formula 
specifically requires that Australian prices be set at a predetermined leyel 
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expressed in terms of its relationship to U.S. prices (such as 70% of the 
export value of U.S. flue-cured tobacco) (Blank). Clearly, this is a case 
of rule-of-thumb pricing which creates policy interdependence. 
The discussion above implies that a causal relationship may exist between 
U.S. and Australia (and other countries') tobacco prices if the smaller 
trading nation follows U.S. price movements by using some rule-of-thumb pricing 
method. This question raises a second issue: if other countries set their 
tobacco prices in accord with U.S. price movements, is there a resulting foreign 
supply response to U.S. price changes? Both of these issues are evaluated 
below for the case of Australia. 
Causal Relationship Between Prices 
The new formula for setting Australian domestic tobacco pri ces assures that 
a causal relationship will exist in the future between U. S . and Australian 
prices. To determine whether U.S. price movements have inf l uenced Australian 
price movements in the past, a causality test suggested by Granger and refined 
by Geweke is applied to annual data from 1960-82. 
The test, as outlined by Bessler and Brandt, directly utilizes ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression on levels of the time series . To test causality 
running from U.S. f.o.b . export prices (X) to Australian domestic prices (Y) 
of flue-cured tobacco at time t, the following specification is used: 
where p and q are the number of lags (j and k) used to eliminate autocorre l ation, 
e1t and e2t are white noise residuals, a1 j and a 2j are parameters relating Yt 
and its lagged values, and b2k are parameters relating Yt and past values 
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(from time t-k) of X. The sum of squared errors from OLS regressions on (1) 
and (2) are used to calculate the well-known statistic, F*, which tests the 
hypothesis that X causes Y (Pierce and Haugh). 
Bessler and Brandt also present a test of no instantaneous causality which 
is based on the residuals from equation (2) and those from 
Results of the tests for one-way causality between U.S. export prices and 
Australian domestic prices of flue-cured tobacco are 
U.S. +Aust F* 25.38 (significant at the 99% level) 
Aust+ U.S. F* 1.10 (insignificant at the 95% level). 
The equations were estimated using only one lagged value because all lags of 
more than one year proved to have an insignificant effect on Yt. The two F* 
statistics above indicate that there is strong one-way causality from U.S. to 
Australian prices while there is no significant one-way causality running 
from Australian to U.S. prices. In addition, the result F* = 0.03 (insignificant 
at the 95% level) for the test of no instantaneous causality strengthens the 
conclusion that Australian tobacco prices are significantly influenced by 
U.S. prices which, in turn, are determined without any influence from 
Australian markets. 
Foreign Supply Response 
The fact that Australian prices are influenced by U.S. prices and that 
the two price series have been highly correlated (r = .90) leads to the 
expectation that there will be an Australian supply response to U.S. tobacco 
price changes. Even though Australian producers may evaluate only Australian 
prices when making their production decisions, the new price setting formula 
means that indirectly those producers will be responding to U.S. price signals 
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in the future. In the past the Australian price was not tied directly to 
the U.S. price so other variables may have been more significant in determining 
supply response. 
The new Australian price setting formula creates a systematic relationship 
between U.S. export prices and Australian domestic prices whereas the relation-
ship has been somewhat spurious in the past. The new arrangements have trans-
formed the role of the Australian government into one of simply transmitting 
U.S. export prices to the Australian market after making an adjustment (which 
is known in advance). Due to the fact that the U.S. announces its planned 
price levels in advance and that there is a six-month difference between the 
seasons in the two countries, Australian producers will be responding to U.S. 
prices. In the past the Australian government played a much more important 
role in setting prices . Even though there was a causal relationship between 
U.S. and Australian prices, the Australian government set specific domestic 
price levels after considering additional variables such as cost of production 
(BAE, p. 90). This means that the relationship between the two price series 
was spurious in that U.S. prices influenced the Australian government which, 
in turn, set Australian domestic prices. 
Several types of government intervention influence Australian tobacco 
markets, thus altering the supply response process. For example, all sales 
of Australian tobacco are made under an official grade and minimum price 
schedule drawn up annually by the Australian Tobacco Board. Also, the Common-
wealth government is continuing a scheme under which manufacturers must use 
a certain minimum percentage of Australian leaf in order to qualify for a 
concessional rate of duty on imported tobacco (BAE, p. 90-1). Therefore, 
tobacco supply response will not be typical of responses from competitive 
markets (Pandey, Piggott and MacAulay). 
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To test whether there has been an Australian supply response to changes 
in the U.S. export prices a linear model was formulated as follows: 
(4) Qt= a+ b0 Pt + b1Pt-l + ·•• + bnPt-n - c1PPt + c 2t + Ut 
where tis time, a linear trend where t 1 1970, ..• , t 13 = 1982; Qt is total 
Australian acreage (1,000 ha) planted to tobacco at time t; Pt is the U.S. 
export price index deflated by the Australian producer price received index; 
PPt is the Australian producer prices paid index; a, b's, and e's are parameters 
to be estimated and Ut is an error term in time t. The model, similar to that 
used by Levins, was estimated directly using OLS regressions of annual data 
from 1970 to 1982 incorporating only one lagged price variable (Pt-l) because 
it was expected that resources could be shifted in or out of tobacco production 
from one year to the next. Also, Qt was specified as acreage total rather 
than production total to better reflect producer decisions without the added 
variance which the yield per hectare factor gives to total production figures. 
It is believed that estimation results for equation (4) will provide some 
insight into the nature of the pricing process being used by Australia (in 
the past) as well as providing a base for describing the supply response to 
that pricing process. Implicit in the specification of (4) are hypotheses 
concerning relationships between supply (Qt) and both U.S. export prices (Pt) 
and Australian input prices (PPt). If Pt proves to be a significant influence 
on Qt while PPt is insignificant, the implication is that price leadership 
may be the prevalent pricing influence in the Australian market. On the 
other hand, if PPt is significant and Pt is not, rule-of-thumb pricing is 
implied since the variable PPt is a proxy for government actions (the govern-
ment used "cost of production" as its primary justification for setting prices 
in the past -- BAE, pp. 90-1). However, if both Pt and PPt are significant 
influences on Qt, both market price leadership and rule-of-thumb processes 
may be operating, but there would be no evidence as to which was dominant. 
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Upon estimation the first specification of the model had two insignificant 
variables so a second specification was estimated with those variables omitted, 
yielding the following: 
(5) Qt = 10.2 
(5.96) 
+ .574Pt 
(0.98) 
.045PPt 
(8.57) 
-2 
where R = .92, DW = 2.27, and the numbers in parentheses are the t-test values 
for the variables. The two remaining variables each have the expected signs, 
but the U.S. price variable is not significant. 
The results above indicate (1) there was not an Australian supply response 
to U.S. export prices, and (2) government-induced rule-of-thumb pricing 
methods appeared to be dominant in the Australian tobacco market. Therefore , 
it is expected that in each country where the government plays a significant 
role in the price setting process using some type of rule-of-thumb , there 
will not be a direct supply response to U.S. prices, even though prices 
will generally follow the trend set by the U. S. 
Concluding Remarks 
It appears that the U.S . may be performing the function of a price leader 
in an oligopolistic world flue-cured tobacco industry. The eight largest 
tobacco exporting nations (including the U.S.) represent 85 percent of world 
tobacco exports at this time, implying the existence of an oligopoly. In an 
oligopoly it is expected that small firms (trading nations) will follow the 
price trend set by a price leader. Such interdependent behavior is evident 
in the "world" tobacco industry, although the U.S. may not have purposely 
taken the leadership role. It is likely that other nations (such as 
Australia) simply chose to follow the largest trader, the U.S., by adopting 
policies involving a rule-of-thumb method of pricing. 
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A major implication of such market behavior is that change in U.S. 
tobacco prices may cause an indirect international supply response as other 
nations adjust their prices accordingly. However, the extent of any response 
depends on how choices concerning domestic market prices and quantities are 
made in other countries - through market competition or public administration. 
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